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GIFI'S-lnformal Writing as Substitute for Delivery
Traditionally, three requirements must be satisfied in order to
make a valid inter vivos gift of personal property: (I) the donor must
demonstrate his intention to make such a gift; (2) there must be a delivery to the donee of the property itself or of an instrument or deed of
gift; and (3) the donee must accept this delivery.1 I£ the subject matter
of the gift is not susceptible of immediate delivery, a question arises as
to the means by which the delivery requirement may be satisfied.
Although a donor in such a situation commonly delivers an informal
·writing which reflects or confirms his intention to make the gift, the
courts have been widely split on the issue of whether such delivery
should be accepted as a substitute for delivery of the subject matter of
the gift. 2 Two recent cases illustrate this divergence of opinion.
In Lewis v. Burke,3 the alleged donor, prior to her death, addressed a letter to one George Lewis indicating her intention to make
him a gift of all of her household furnishings. The letter stated that
the furnishings are "yours now and you take them whenever you
want to." 4 Thereafter a few pieces of furniture were transferred
to Lewis' home, although the major portion of the furnishings remained with the decedent until her death. Lewis subsequently filed
a petition against the estate of the decedent, claiming ownership
of the household furnishings by virtue of the alleged inter yivos gift.
The Indiana Appellate Court, in affirming a judgment against the
alleged donee, held that the gift was incomplete for lack of delivery; 5
the delivered ·writing was found to give nothing to the intended
donee. 6
The court's decision was consistent with precedent,7 but inconsistent with the obvious intention of the would-be donor. The result
seems needlessly harsh in light of the approach taken recently by a
Connecticut court. In Hebrew University Association v. Nye, 8 the
plaintiffs brought an action against the trustees of a foundation cre1. See, e.g., In re Scherzinger's Estate, 272 App. Div. 722, 74 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1947); In
re Albert's Will, 68 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Tabor v. Tabor, 73 R.I. 491, 57 A.2d
735 (1948); .BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 84 (2d ed. 1955).
2. Compare In re Harlow's Estate, 239 Mo. App. 607, 192 S.W.2d 5 (1945) and
Reynolds v. Maust, 142 Pa. Super. 109, 15 A.2d 853 (1940), with DeMouy v. Jepson, 255
Ala. 337, 51 So. 2d 506 (1951) and .Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. Gray, 53 R.I. 377,
166 At!. 817 (1933).
3. 214 N.E.2d 186 (Ind. App. 1966).
4. Id. at 187.
5. Id. at 189.
6. Id. at 188. The court mentioned that delivery of informal memoranda may be
appropriate in "special situations," such as gifts involving real property or choses in
action, but found no such "special situations" to exist in the present case.
7. See, e.g., Kraus v. Kraus, 235 Ind. 325, 132 N.E,2d 608 (1956); Bulen v. Pendleton
Co., 118 Ind. App. 217, 78 N.E.2d 449 (1948).
8. 26 Conn. Supp. 342, 223 A.2d 397 (Super. Ct. 1966). Additional facts may be found
in the report of the first trial in 148 Conn. 223, 169 A.2d 641 (1961).
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ated by the decedent's will, seeking to have the university declared
the legal and equitable ovmer of decedent's library of rare books
and manuscripts. The decedent, prior to her death, had stated orally
that she was making a gift of her library to the university. 9 Subsequent
to this and several similar declarations, the decedent delivered to the
university a memorandum listing the contents of the library, although
she did not transfer possession of the books themselves. The court
held that the decedent's conduct demonstrated an intention to "give
and to divest herself of any mvnership of the library,''10 and that this
was sufficient to constitute an inter vivas gift. In arriving at this
decision, the court noted the general rule that the subject matter of
the gift must actually be delivered in order to constitute a completed
gift, but concluded that, where the property does not readily admit
of immediate delivery, a constructive or symbolic delivery is sufficient. Without clearly defining symbolic or constructive delivery, the
court stated that "the donor must do that which, under the circumstances, will in reason be equivalent to an actual delivery . . . if
manual delivery is impractical or inconvenient." 11 It was the
court's opinion that the decedent's library was not susceptible of immediate transfer and consequently that the donor's oral pronouncement that a gift was made and her delivery of the wTitten memorandum to the university constituted an adequate substitute for delivery of the library itself. Since there would appear to be no
significant difference with respect to ease of delivery between the
contents of a rare book library and the furnishings in a house, the
holding in Nye seems to be directly contrary to the holding in Lewis,
and the former decision, upholding the validity of the gift, seems to
be the better view.12 Nevertheless, the lack of clarity surrounding the
notions of "constructive" and "symbolic" delivery suggests that there
is need of a sounder conceptual framework for analysis.
Generally, when courts have accepted delivery of a written memorandum as a valid substitute for delivery of the gift property itself,
the rationale, as in Nye, has been that the ·writing constitutes either
a symbolic or a constructive delivery.13 Symbolic delivery has been
defined as the transference of some symbol of the gift, such as a minia9. The university was located overseas but the court did not think this to be of
relevance to its holding that physical delivery was impracticable.
10. 26 Conn. Supp. 342, 345, 223 A.2d 397, 399 (Super. Ct. 1966).
II. Id. at 344, 223 A.2d at 399.
12. Mechem considered delivery of a writing to be a valid substitute for actual
delivery. Mechem, The Requirements of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in
Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REv. 341, 586 (1926).
13. See, e.g., Binnell v. Iverson, 147 Colo. 552, 364 P .2d 385 (1961); Kintzinger v.
Millin, 254 Iowa 173, 117 N.W.2d 68 (1962); Hudson v. Tuck.er, 188 Kan. 202, 361 P.2d
878 (1961); Balfour's Estate v. Seitz, 392 Pa. 300, 140 A.2d 441 (1958); Smith v. Johnson,
223 S.C. 64, 74 S.E.2d 419 (1953).
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ture replica, to the donee.14 Constructive delivery, on the other hand,
has been said to refer to the transference of some object which gives
to the donee physical access or control over the subject of the intended
gift. 15 A delivered written memorandum bears slight resemblance to
constructive delivery since it does not provide access to the gift property. Admittedly, it may bear closer relation to symbolic delivery,
although it clearly does not act as a symbol of the property in the same
manner as does a miniature replica. The courts, in an effort to validate such gifts, have generally classified these informal writings as
fitting into either one or the other category without taking notice of
the formal definitions. 16 Since neither definition applies satisfactorily
to the delivery of an informal written memorandum, confusion is
certain to continue.
It is possible to justify upholding such gifts without torturing
inappropriate concepts. The requirement of a manual delivery of the
subject of a gift has often been said to serve three functions: (I) it
makes the donor unequivocally aware of the significance of the act he
is performing; (2) it makes clear to any third party the nature of the
act performed; and (3) it gives the donee presumptive evidence of
his claim to the property. 17 The delivery of a ·written document also
would seem to fulfill these purposes. The donor's act of writing out
his intention to make a gift and his subsequent transfer of this
writing should be sufficient to impress upon him the finality of his
decision. Furthermore, possession of the memorandum by the donee
should constitute at least some evidence of his rights in the gift property.
Given this justification, there appear to be two sound approaches
for effectuating a donor's written intention to make a gift when the
subject of the gift is not susceptible of delivery. One possible solution
is a formal judicial recognition that state statutes abolishing the
requirement of a seal have, in effect, raised informal writings to the
position formerly accorded sealed instruments. It was almost universally held that the transference of a sealed deed of gift constituted a
valid delivery18 and therefore it is arguable that an unsealed instru14. See, e.g., Coleman v. Parker, II4 Mass. 30 (1873); Newman v. Bost, 122 N.C. 524,
29 S.E. 848 (1898); Lavender v. Pritchard, 3 N.C. 337 (1805).
15. Se In re Reist's Estate, 158 Pa. Super. 281, 44 A.2d 847 (1945); Smith v. Johnson,
223 S.C. 64, 74 S.E.2d 419 (1953); Collins v. McCanless, 179 Tenn. 656, 169 S.W.2d 850
(1943); In re Gallinger's Estate, 31 Wash. 2d 823, 199 P.2d 575 (1948).
16. See cases cited note 14 supra. In a leading New York case, the court allowed a
writing to effectuate an inter vivos gift, but the court termed the writing variously as
an "instrument of gift," "a good symbolical delivery," or "a good constructive or
symbolic delivery." Matter of Cohn, 187 App. Div. 392, 176 N.Y.S. 225 {1919). For other
illustrations of the problems inherent in defining the legal impact of delivered writing,
see 45 KY. L.J. 160 (1956).
17. 1 AIGLER, SMITH &: TEFFI', PROPERTY 226 (1960); .BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 86
(2d ed. 1955); Mechem, supra note 12, at 348.
18. See, e.g., McRae v. Pegues, 4: Ala. 158 (184:2); Wyche v. Greene, 11 Ga. 159 (1852);
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ment should have the same effect in states that have abolished the
requirement of a seal. This issue seems never to have been litigated,
although a literal reading of many of these statutes seems to support
such a judicial recognition. 19 The Indiana statute, for example, states
explicitly that an unsealed ·writing will have the "same force and
effect that it would have if sealed," 20 and, therefore, the courts in that
state seem to have a clear statutory basis for allowing the delivery of
informal unsealed writings to pass valid inter vivos gifts of personal
property.
A second and perhaps better solution would be for the states
to enact a statute permitting the transference of informal memoranda to satisfy the delivery requirement. To date, six states have
adopted such statutes.21 Typical of these is the West Virginia statute
which prescribes that, regardless of the circumstances, delivery of an
informal writing is to be an alternative to delivery of the gift property.22 A federal court in applying this statute held that a letter
delivered to a donee stating the donor's intention to make a gift of
certain bonds was a valid gift even though the donor did not deliver
the bonds and later denied ever having intended to do so.23 Since
such an application of the statute raises the spectre of fraud, it might
be desirable to build in a procedural safeguard. The burden of proof
could be placed on the alleged donee to explain not only the circumstances surrounding the gift itself, but also the rC:ason that th~ gift
was not delivered. Thus, the courts could raise a rebuttable presumption against the validity of any present gift that was actually
suitable for delivery. Coupling this presumption with a requirement
that the ·writing demonstrate on its face the intention of the donor
to make a gift should provide the courts with an adequate safeguard against fraud.
Curriden v. Chandler, 79 N.H. 269, 108 Atl. 296 (1919); Garrison v. Spencer, 58 Okla.
442, 160 Pac. 493 (1916).
19. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 52.08 (1941); IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-1601 (1933); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 358.01 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 431.010 (1949); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-15-101
(1955); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-57 (1957).
20. The statute provides that "there shall be no difference in evidence between
sealed and unsealed writings; and every writing not sealed shall have the same force
and effect that it would have if sealed. A writing under seal, except conveyances of real
estate, or any interest therein, may, therefore, be changed, or altogether discharged, by
a writing not under seal." IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-1601 (repl. vol. 1946).
21. A.Riz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-601 (1956); CALIF. CIV. CODE § 1147 (1954); MoNT.
REv. CODES ANN. § 67-1707 (repl. vol. 1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-11-07 (1960); TEX.
REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 3998 (1945); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-1-5 (1966).
22. The section of the statute relating to delivery of a writing provides, inter alia,
that "no gift of any goods or chattels shall be valid unless made by writing, signed by
the donor or his agent, or by will •••• No seal shall be necessary to give validity to a
gift of goods or chattels by writing, as hereinbefore provided." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 361-5 (1966).
23. Smith v. Smith, 253 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1958).

